The landslide victory of TISZA (the Freedom & Reform Party) in last Sunday’s General Election has raised hopes of a much-needed social and economic revival in Hungary.
Though, Western outlets have framed the win of TISZA and its leader, Péter Magyar, as a victory for ‘Europe’s democratic values’, bringing an end to the 16-year rule of an authoritarian Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz (Civic Alliance) government.
Yet this narrative offers a simplistic view of the challenges facing Hungarians. While ‘Russia-led culture wars’ have dominated headlines, Orbán’s removal has been driven as much by economic frustration laid at Orban and Fidesz.
The reality is underscored as for three consecutive years, Hungary has languished at the bottom of EU economies, recording a meagre GDP growth rate of just 0.4% since 2023.
With Fidesz ousted by a two-thirds majority, TISZA now carries the weight of delivering some form or other of an economic overhaul. Expectations are high across all sectors, and none more so than gambling, which has remained stuck in the slow lane of liberalisation.
Fidesz reforms played a trick on EU eyes
The need for intervention by TISZA in gambling is underscored by Stasya Yautodzyeva, Head of Analytics at 4H Agency, who points to a market long shaped by political cronyism at the highest levels of government.
“Hungary’s gambling sector did not evolve as a neutral regulatory framework — it developed as part of a broader political economy, where access to licences, concessions and market participation was closely aligned with the priorities of the governing system,” she explains.
“The extension of casino concessions to 2056 ahead of expiry was not just a regulatory decision — it signalled the long-term entrenchment of a closed, incumbent-friendly model.”
The backdrop explains why the 2021–2022 reforms failed to produce genuine competition. On paper, Hungary moved between 2022-2023 to end the online monopoly of Szerencsejáték Zrt.
Yet the mandate was treated as a trick show by Fidesz to stop the CJEU from probing Hungary’s gambling market by the pretence of launching a multi-licence model open to EEA operators and ending the privileged status of Szerencsejáték Zrt.
However in practice, Fidesz barely touched the structure of its regime. as Yautodzyeva notes: “Since 2023, the market has remained effectively closed, with just two licensed online operators tippmixpro.hu, run by Szerencsejáték Zrt and vegas.hu, operated by LVC Diamond.”
“The reforms changed the legal form of the system, but not its economic reality. What emerged was a technically compliant framework that still produced a highly concentrated and commercially unattractive market for new entrants.”
In reality, little changed beneath the surface. Licensing conditions, technical requirements and administrative barriers continued to favour the state-owned incumbent.
As Hungarian gaming legal expert Helembai Gábor notes, the result is a system that is technically compliant, but functionally unchanged.
“Those judgments pushed Budapest into reform, but they did not create an actually open market,” Gábor states.
“Legally, Hungary adjusted its framework. Commercially, however, the core restrictive architecture has never been fully dismantled.”
Zrt attack… Control over liberalisation
The question, therefore, is not whether Hungary opens its gambling market but how much control it is willing to give up.
A TISZA government enters office with both the political mandate and the institutional power to revisit the foundations of the current system.
Its campaign rhetoric has already singled out concession-based industries including gambling as areas requiring scrutiny, particularly in relation to the allocation of public assets and long-term contracts.
As expected, the need to proceed with reforms is led by economic accountability, states Helembai Gábor: “The TISZA Party has made the gambling industry one of its primary targets for holding the previous system accountable and reviewing state concession contracts.”
Prior to the party’s congress in July 2025, as part of their preparations for governing, Magyar officially announced that one of the very first tasks of a TISZA government would be to investigate the fate of “stolen public funds” and the “thousands of billions funneled out through concession contracts”.
Yet the path forward for TISZA is far from straightforward to simply apply reforms. As Gábor makes clear, the state’s position is inherently conflicted regardless of who is in power.
Challenging the all-dominant position of Szerencsejáték Zrt is a politically sensitive dynamic of Hungarian politics that Gabor views as a “Catch-22 position”.
“It is obviously not in the Hungarian state’s interest to create competition for a 100% state-owned company (Szerencsejáték Zrt), which has otherwise profited significantly from market restrictions in recent years.”
Yet the pressure to reform may not be optional for TISZA and Magyar: “Numerous factors argue in favour of market liberalisation,” Gábor continues, pointing to “the need to loosen monopolistic structures, align with EU law, and create a framework capable of unlocking frozen EU funds”.
For Yautodzyeva, this tension defines the next phase of Hungarian policy: “TISZA is not inheriting a broken market — it is inheriting a deliberately constructed system of controlled access,” she says.
“The real question is whether it chooses to dismantle that system, or simply recalibrate it to appear more open while maintaining core state advantages.”
Yer Gabor retorts that, based on current dynamics “the logical step would be a “surgically precise” market opening: the TISZA Party would preserve the market positions of Szerencsejáték Zrt. as much as possible, while generating serious competition for current concession holders through an EU-compliant, open, and transparent process.
Such a model would allow Budapest to demonstrate compliance with EU expectations, unlock potential investment, and expand its tax base — without dismantling the core architecture of state control.
Realities of change
Even with political will, structural constraints will define the pace — and limits — of reform.
Long-term concession agreements — most notably casino licences extended to 2056 create significant legal barriers to any rapid overhaul. Reopening these arrangements would raise complex questions around property rights, compensation and legal certainty.
As Gábor cautions: “No specific industry program from the TISZA Party is known yet, so for now we are operating in the realm of assumptions—but any meaningful reform will have to navigate deeply entrenched legal positions.”
For international observers, many should watch the Hungarian market, to see whether the TISZA government is brave enough to tackle the systemic cronyism of Szerencsejáték Zrt.
As Gabor notes: “The official stance is that Szerencsejáték Zrt. acts as a major patron of Hungarian culture, sports, and civil society. They argue that the recipients of these funds are prominent, successful actors in the entertainment, tourism, and sports industries, and that the sponsorships are distributed legally to support events and initiatives that benefit the public.
“Ultimately, the controversy is less about illegal under-the-table bribes, and more about a systemic, legal framework where a state monopoly’s immense profits are disproportionately distributed to the political ecosystem of the ruling party.”
Big picture… Hungary’s economic reset
Yautodzyeva adds that expectations should remain grounded: “The presence of long-duration concessions means that Hungary cannot pivot overnight to a fully competitive model.
Change is far more likely to come in layers — starting with access rules and licensing conditions before touching the deeper concession structure.”
This staged approach would see initial reforms focused on reducing entry barriers, followed by gradual expansion of market participation.
More fundamental changes — such as separating online casino rights from land-based concessions — would signal a genuine shift toward competition, but also represent the most politically sensitive battleground.
The new government has an opportunity to move away from a system widely viewed as closed, politically aligned and resistant to competition. But early signals suggest this will not be a story of overnight liberalisation.
Instead, as Yautodzyeva concludes: “Hungary is facing a strategic policy choice. It can maintain a formally regulated but functionally closed system, or move toward a modern European model based on open access, clear rules and genuine channelisation.”
In that sense, gambling reform will serve as one of many litmus tests for Hungary’s wider economic reset taken on by TISZA.
The challenge is not simply to open the market but to decide how much of the old system it is willing to leave behind.
“Unless TISZA presents a clear roadmap to structurally change Hungarian gambling and end Zrt privileges. International incumbents should expect incremental adjustments over a free market boom.”